Remembering beliefs by Devitt, S
 
 
 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
This is the accepted version of this article. To be published as : 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Catalogue from Homo Faber 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
Devitt, Susannah K. (2008) Remembering beliefs. In: Proceedings of 
the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 23 ‐ 26 
July 2008, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington D.C. 
           
Copyright 2008 Susannah Kate Devitt 
Remembering Beliefs 
 
Susannah Kate Devitt (skdevitt@gmail.com) 
Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, 152 Frelinghuysen Rd. 
Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA 
 
 
Abstract 
Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pin-
point the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate 
from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues 
that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience 
provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly 
as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring 
literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic 
beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the 
experience of remembering from biological facts of 
memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory 
qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a 
failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. 
functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue 
that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision 
is a way to rationally incorporate information from 
conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent 
difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a 
Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. 
Lewis' coherence argument for memorial knowledge.  
Keywords: remembering; belief; source monitoring; 
Bayesian; qualia; Bayesian rationality; decision making, self 
knowledge, memory. 
Introduction 
Optimized decision-making requires us to track the origins 
of our mental experiences as accurately as possible. While 
normal subjects can be quite reliable at distinguishing, say, 
memories from imaginings, they are also susceptible to false 
memories (Loftus, 1997). Participants who report a false 
memory not only find the fiction familiar and have strong 
beliefs about its veracity, but they also claim to re-
experience vividly the details of its prior occurrence. 
Conversely, psychogenic amnesias have been reported in 
patients with multiple personality disorder, dissociative 
fugue or post-traumatic stress disordere.g. rape victims 
(Kihlstrom & Schacter, 2000). Individuals with psychogenic 
amnesia respond to stimuli associated with an instigating 
event without any familiarity or sense of connection to this 
past. In light of this evidence that subjective judgment is a 
poor guide to the true origin of our thoughts, one might 
wonder whether consciousness has any functional use in 
cognition at all. Perhaps consciousness is epiphenomenal?  
In this paper I argue that consciousness is not 
epiphenomenal. I elucidate how the subjective experience of 
memory (mnemic qualia) and our remembering beliefs 
contribute to decision-making. More specifically I argue for 
a Bayesian coherence-based method of deciphering between 
memories and imaginings.  
Remembering 
Anything learnt by an organism and held in memory is 
remembered when it affects subsequent behavior. The many 
systems of memory are divided by cognitive psychology 
into two main categories: implicit and explicit memory. 
Implicit memory systems are grouped as those that operate 
beneath the level of conscious awareness or reflection 
regardless of their underlying structure (Schacter, 1987). 
The most basic sort of implicit memory is habituation, 
where the bodys systems adapt to environmental stimuli, 
e.g. becoming oblivious of background noise. Some 
memories are formed as simple associations to stimuli, such 
as Pavlovs (1927) salivating dog in response to a bell. 
Others result in cognitive maps and representations (e.g., 
Tolman, 1948; Morris, 1981), as is hypothesized to explain 
celestial bird navigation.. Philosophers describe implicit 
processes as procedural or knowledge-how when they 
refer to skill-based or embodied memories and tacit 
knowledge when they refer to representational memories 
beneath the level of awareness (Fodor, 1968; Lycan, 1986). 
Although there is immense debate about the use of these 
terms, it is sufficient for my purposes that representational 
and procedural memory systems exist without need for 
introspective access. 
In contrast to implicit memory, explicit memory requires 
an agent to be conscious of its own thoughts; that is, capable 
of second-order thoughts about first-order mental states. 
Explicit memory is divided into two types: episodic and 
semantic (Tulving & Donaldson, 1972). The former is 
brought to bear when we consider the particulars of a past 
event and experience the feeling of being there (Baddeley, 
2002). Recollection can elicit emotions, mental imagery, 
sounds or other cross-modal phenomenology. On the other 
hand, semantic memory is the source of abstracted, more 
generalized knowledge of the world, e.g., that 5 x 7 = 35. 
Semantic memory does not necessitate that the agent 
mentally time travel to the occasion of learning. Explicit 
memory is propositional in a way that implicit memory need 
not be.  
In this paper I claim that the minimal conditions required 
for remembering are a causal connection to the learning 
event and the retention and subsequent impact of this learnt 
material on behavior, regardless of our conscious awareness 
or attribution. On the other hand, the minimal requirement 
for episodic memoryrecollectionrequires remembering 
with belief and mnemic qualia.  
Belief 
Beliefs are a representational state that plays a particular 
functional role in the cognitive architecture of the mind, 
and, along with desires, provide causal explanations for 
actions (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Beliefs are truth-evaluable, 
so having a belief constitutes a judgment about some matter 
of fact. These judgments affect behavior, decision-making 
and other beliefs. This is true, even if one takes a 
probabilistic view to belief (e.g. Bayesian) thresholds. 
Beliefs fit into a computational structure of the mind 
without the need for the experiential qualitative character 
of conscious experience (Strawson, 2004). Beliefs must 
operate flexibly and be influenced by other beliefs and 
competing thoughts such as hopes or desires, affective 
information or biological desires such as thirst.  
In a sense, all beliefs are memories because they are 
formed and carried forward in time. However, memories 
arent necessarily beliefs. When remember is used in 
relation to non-representational sorts of memories (e.g. 
conditioning), belief is not involved. On the other hand, 
when we consider remembering as a cognitive activity, then 
belief plays a greater role. It seems likely that animals such 
as dolphins have beliefs regardless of any explicit capacity 
to communicate them. Reflective agents generate explicit 
memories with associated beliefs about them. However, I 
will argue that only episodic memory requires a belief that it 
is indeed a memory. Semantic memory does not require 
belief for the following reason: we can explicitly state facts 
that weve learnt about the past without conviction that we 
are right and the act remains classified as semantic 
memory. Of course, simply because we can have semantic 
memory without correct beliefs, this should not be taken as 
a normative claim. 
Mnemic Qualia 
In addition to belief, remembering involves qualia. Mnemic 
qualia is the qualitative, experiential aspect of remembering, 
including what Bertrand Russell (1921) described as a 
feeling of familiarity. For certain sorts of memory such as 
conditioning, mnemic qualia may be limited to familiarity, 
such as the comforting sensation of remembering how to 
ride a bicycle or how to knit after a long absence from the 
activity. The quality and quantity of qualia increases when it 
comes to episodic memory and may include vivid mental 
imagery, sounds and emotions in addition to recognition. 
The familiarity of mnemic qualia should be kept distinct 
from the phenomenal aspect as they are not necessarily 
experienced together, for example, one might experience a 
mental image informed by our memory, yet we do not find 
it familiar or one might experience a sense of familiarity of 
a purely imagined image. 
I argue that of all the types of memory, only episodic 
requires belief and mnemic qualia. Consider the following 
circumstance: Marys parents found an old photo album in 
the attic that Mary has never seen before. Her parents show 
Mary a photo of herself riding a mechanical pig with wings 
at a county fair that she does not recognize. Her parents 
enthusiastically tell Mary a detailed story of her experience; 
i.e. how happy she was, what she was wearing, that she 
ended up at the hospital with two stitches after falling off. 
Suppose Mary goes on to recount this story in detail to her 
friends at a later time. My question is: When she repeats the 
story, is she recollecting it? She certainly has correct beliefs 
and she did indeed experience the events in question, 
however, I claim that because her qualia was caused by her 
parents description and the photo, rather than the event 
itself, then she cannot be said to be recollecting it. 
Recollection requires a sense of familiarity and qualia 
caused by the event itself, not via testimony or other means.  
The qualities of our qualia can be a guide as to whether 
our experiences are imaginary or remembrances, perhaps 
because the latter tend to be more detailed, coherent or 
colorful than make-believe. Hume (1777) noted that unlike 
imaginings, memories seem more vivid or convincing. He 
supposed that the way we distinguish between the two states 
was entirely qualitative. However, qualia can trick us. If we 
put too much weight on how memories feel, rather than 
whether it is rational to believe them, we can make mistakes 
about the origins of what we are experiencing, leading to 
false beliefs, e.g. imaginary stories can gain familiarity if 
they are repeated often and memories can fade into 
obscurity as they age. 
In this section I have introduced implicit, pre-conscious 
memory and more explicit types. Each of these different 
memory systems have a unique connection with belief and 
qualia. Part of this paper aims to clarify philosophical 
problems that arise from confusing these different memory 
systems and their relationship to belief. For example, the 
discrepancy between belief and remembering leads to the 
following two scenarios: 1) suppose that we are in the right 
causal connection to an event and have memory-driven 
qualia, yet we do not believe that it is memory? And 2) 
suppose were having imagination-driven qualia and have a 
belief that an experience is a memory, yet we do not have 
the right connection to an event? What should we make of 
these cases? When are we truly remembering? In the next 
section I will address these questions by examining the 
philosophical literature on remembering and belief. 
Remembering Requires Belief 
Although philosophers have considered implicit memory in 
their discussions, the focus is generally on explicit memory; 
either declarative memory for facts (semantic) or events 
(episodic). Philosophers have typically argued that an act of 
remembering x requires the belief that x has occurred; 
for example, Aristotle states: whenever someone is actively 
engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this 
way that he heard, or perceived or thought this before. 
449b22-24 (Sorabji, 2004).  
Aristotle claims that our experience of remembering 
always involves the belief that we are thinking of a past 
thing. Because Aristotle speaks of the feeling of 
remembering and the active nature of the search, it is likely 
that he is referring to recollecting, rather than just semantic 
recall or implicit memory. Locke (1689) makes a similar 
point: the mind has a power in many cases to revive 
perceptions that it has once had, with attached to them the 
additional perception that it has had them before Essay, Bk 
II, Ch. X, Sec. 2. The way Locke speaks of re-experiencing 
past perceptions, suggests that he is referring to reviving 
particulars of the past, thus another case of episodic 
memory.  
Like most pre-20th century philosophers, Aristotle and 
Locke thought that mental images played a central role in 
thought and sought to discriminate between imagined 
images and mnemic images via ones attitude towards them. 
That is, in order to qualify as an act of remembering, the 
person must believe that the image is a copy of a past thing 
rather than simply an invention. To retain the gist of these 
writers and avoid talk of mental imagery we can substitute 
phenomenal content. 
Many philosophers have continued this tradition into the 
20th century. Russell (1921), Harrod (1942) and Furlong 
(1951) all argued that having the right beliefs about 
phenomenal content was a necessary component of a logical 
distinction between imagination and memory.  In Analysis 
of Mind (AOM), Russell says that memory of past 
sensations seems only possible by means of present images 
(IX). He is referring to the qualia of episodic memory. He 
goes on to say that images without beliefs are insufficient 
to constitute memory; and that habits are still more 
insufficient. Russell indicates that simply having 
phenomenology and the right causal connection to an event 
will not ground an experience as a memory. What is 
required is conviction; the belief that ones reminiscences 
are in fact of the past and this conviction yields the feeling 
of familiarity. Therefore, believing that x has occurred is 
necessary for recollecting x.   
Remembering Does Not Require Belief 
In opposition to Russell, C.B Martin and Max Deutscher 
(1966) argue that we can remember x without belief that x 
has occurred. From the framework outlined above it is non-
controversial that the implicit memory systems, both 
embodied and representational, operate without any 
requirement for belief by the organism. What about the 
explicit memory systems?   
M&Ds asks readers to imagine a painter who, when 
asked to create an imaginary scene, ends up painting a 
detailed picture of a farmyard that he visited as a young 
boyas confirmed by his parents. M&D state, although 
the painter sincerely believes that his work is purely 
imaginary, and represents no real scene, the amazed 
observers have all the evidence needed to establish that in 
fact he is remembering a scene from childhood. (168).  
This is an instance where the painters map-like, 
propositional representations are used to illustrate the scene, 
even though the painters beliefs are in opposition to this 
fact. The conflict between mnemic qualia and belief explain 
the painters ability to sketch an accurate scene, to 
remember it, without realizing he is remembering. The 
painter lacks recognition or a sense of familiarity though he 
has memory.  
Circumstances such as these might be considered a 
mnemic blindsight effect. Blindsight is a phenomenon 
where patients with partial blindness are able to respond 
accurately to visual cues better than chance, even without 
visual phenomenology (Stoerig & Cowey, 1997). In the case 
of memory, blindsight occurs when a person utilizes 
remembered information without awareness that it is 
remembered.  
A critic might object that M&Ds painter example has no 
basis in fact, however, there are intriguing examples in the 
empirical literature. Lyon (1985) describes a patient who 
was unable to explicitly retrieve any autobiographical 
information, yet dialed their mothers phone number when 
asked to randomly dial numbers. A patient of Gudjonssons 
(1979) had heightened electrodermal responses to some 
items of personal relevance at a time when she was amnesic 
for them. Similar inconsistencies between remembering and 
belief have been reported for multiple personality disorders, 
dissociative fugue and post-traumatic stress disorder 
subjects such as rape victims (for a review see Kihlstrom & 
Schacter, 2000).  
M&D give another case where they claim belief plays no 
role in whether one is remembering, they state:  
Surely people say, I dont know whether I am 
remembering this or imagining it, suggesting that they 
could be remembering something though they neither 
believe nor disbelieve that it happened...It is quite common 
in ordinary life to describe some past event, and then to be 
uncertain whether the description was from memory, or was 
founded on something one was told after the event If it 
were impossible to remember while believing one is not 
remembering, one would be saved the embarrassment of 
thinking that one is originating a tune or an argument when 
one is not (167). 
In this example, a person is suspicious of her own 
judgment and is unsure whether her phenomenal content is a 
memory or an imagining. She is certainly remembering 
somethingbecause even memories of testimony or 
imagined episodes are memoriesbut she cannot pinpoint 
the source of her memory. While her implicit memory is 
informing her current qualia, her beliefs are undecided about 
the origin of the qualia. This uncertainty might be because 
the qualia is not sufficiently familiar or detailed, or that 
other beliefs make the probability of memory seem unlikely. 
Whatever the cause, skeptical concerns are raised 
sufficiently high to withhold judgment. 
M&Ds examples illuminate the difference between 
remembering and recollecting. The minimal conditions 
required for remembering are a causal connection to the 
learning event and the retention and subsequent impact of 
this learnt material on behavior, regardless of our conscious 
awareness or attribution. Where as the minimal requirement 
for recollection, as Russell considers it, requires 
remembering with belief and mnemic qualia.  
In the final analysis, instead of Russell and M&D 
positions being at odds, their ideas are compatible within a 
sophisticated view of memory. With the constitutive 
questions laid to the side, we are ready to tackle the 
epistemic concern of how we evaluate our mental 
experiences and beliefs so that we more reliably identify 
exactly what sort of remembering were engaged with. In 
the next section I outline a Bayesian explanation of the role 
of memory qualia on belief based on evidence from the 
source monitoring literature. 
Source Monitoring 
Much of the time, our thoughts are tracked effortlessly and 
accurately. However, our confidence can waiver such that 
we question our attributions. How do we rationally 
negotiate our own experiences given the inherent 
uncertainty in our phenomenology? Russell suggested that 
the way we distinguish the mental images we trust is via the 
feeling of familiarity that accompany them. He states:  
Some images, like some sensations, feel very familiar, 
while others feel strange. Familiarity is a feeling capable of 
degrees. In an image of a well-known face, for example, 
some parts may feel more familiar than others; when this 
happens, we have more belief in the accuracy of the familiar 
parts than in that of the unfamiliar parts. I think it is by this 
means that we become critical of images, not by some 
imageless memory with which we compare them. AOM, 
IX.  
Russell argues that the more familiar our experience feels, 
the more likely we believe that we are remembering. He 
supposes there is a intimate relationship between mnemic 
qualia and our beliefs about the experience. In order to 
evaluate an experience as a memory rather than a fiction, we 
compare qualities of the image itself with beliefs and 
feelings about the image.  
Psychologists call the reflective method we use to keep 
our memories and imaginings accurately separated source 
monitoring or reality monitoring (Hashtroudi, et.al. 1990; 
Johnson, et.al. 1993; Dobson & Markham, 1993). Source 
monitoring is an inferential process that requires people to 
examine and categorize their mental state based on 
qualitative features of the experience itself and coherence 
between relevant beliefs. The inferential contribution is 
evident in cases of déjà vu, where we first experience the 
familiarity of memory but subsequently rationalize that we 
are not remembering. 
People have minor source monitoring difficulties every 
day regarding the time and context of information 
presented, e.g., confusing the source of a scholarly article. A 
less common source monitoring error (we hope) is 
cryptomnesia, when people not only forget that they 
encountered information before, but believe that they have 
invented it. This can lead to unintentional plagiarism, such 
as the case of Helen Keller. Helen Keller was a blind and 
deaf author. Her story ''The Frost King,'' was first published 
in the alumni magazine of the Perkins Institute for the 
Blind, but was later discovered to bear a striking 
resemblance to The Frost Fairies by Margaret T. Canby. It 
turns out that the latter story was read to Keller when she 
was a child using finger spelling. Nonetheless, she insisted 
that she had no memory of the story (Keller, 1905).  
Another variant of source error stems from subjects being 
manipulated into believing false memories about themselves 
that were suggested by an experimenter, or other 
manipulative means (Loftus, 1997; Brainerd & Reyna, 
2005). In these circumstances subjects not only find fictions 
familiar and have strong beliefs about their veracity, but 
they also claim to re-experience vividly the details of their 
prior occurrence.  Finally, schizophrenic subjects suffer 
from particularly debilitating deficits in reality-monitoring, 
consistently failing to distinguish their delusions from 
reality. Clearly our ability to manage our lives depends on 
our capacity to accurately introspect the origins of our 
mental states. 
The source monitoring literature has found that when 
people are in doubt about their thoughts, they tend to 
introspect their mental state and evaluate the quality of self-
generated perceptual information (e.g. colour), contextual 
data (e.g. spatial information), affective cues (emotional 
reactions) and sometimes memories of cognitive operations 
(e.g. records of thoughts and mental elaboration) to evaluate 
them. Psychologists argue that the more these features 
cohere, the greater the likelihood an experience is actually a 
memory and we revise our beliefs accordingly (Johnson et. 
al. 1993). Still, perhaps our feelings of familiarity, the level 
of detail in our mental imagery or our subjective reports are 
not reliable sources for belief revision? In the next section I 
will argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief 
revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from 
conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent 
difficulties as an epistemic source. 
Bayesian Rationality 
One might think that the source monitoring researchers were 
overly optimistic, yet the coherence view can be defended 
by a probabilistic account of human reasoning: Bayesian 
rationality.  
Bayesian rationality is a calculus of uncertain reasoning 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007). It is a theory that thrives on the 
equivocality of informal, every day thought, using both 
verification and falsification in its method. Bayes theorem 
predicts that the more common a phenomenon, the more 
probable, the less useful each instance is as evidence in 
evaluating a hypothesis; that is, common signals provide 
less information. With the introduction of novel stimuli, our 
brains immediately respond to evaluate its relevance to a 
hypothesis. For example, an individual who consistently 
experiences strong mental imagery whether dreaming, 
imagining or remembering should not take the existence of 
a mental image to be much evidence of the origin of a 
thought, where as their recollection of a smell or texture 
could trigger a dramatic belief revision. 
C.I. Lewis (1946) (reviewed by Olsson & Shogenji, 2004) 
proposed that the congruence between independently 
generated beliefs can raise the probability of what is 
remembered to the level of practical certainty in a way 
analogous to that in which agreement of independently 
given testimonies can eventually make us convinced that 
what is being testified is true. His theory works on the basis 
that there is initial credibility (i.e. a non-zero prior 
probability) for the memory in question.  
Ifthere were no initial presumption attaching to the 
mnemically presented; no valid assumption of a real 
connection with past experience; then no extent of congruity 
with other such items would give rise to any eventual 
credibility. The coherence of a novel, or of the daydreams 
we are aware of fabricating as we go along, can never have 
the slightest weight toward crediting the content of them as 
fact, no matter how detailed and mutually congruent such 
items may be. (Lewis, 357) 
Lewis emphasizes that coherence alone is not sufficient to 
impact belief. One must already have a degree of belief in 
the memory before coherence can play a role. Therefore it 
would not be useful in cases such as cryptomnesia or 
functional amnesia where the subject believes that their 
experiences are not in any way related to memory.  
In addition to the non-zero prior, Lewis theory requires 
both a positive and a negative thesis: The positive thesis is 
that coherence increases the posterior probability that x 
occurred with the number of consistent beliefs. This 
supports the findings from the source monitoring literature 
(Johnson et. al. 1993). The negative thesis is that the 
coherence of independent items of evidence has no impact 
on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has some 
credibility of its own; just as a person with poor eyesight 
would be unwise to consider their mental images as 
informative as their tactile ones. The outcome of this thesis 
is that the degree of congruence is inversely related to the 
prior probability of the supported hypothesis, so agreement 
on something antecedently improbable gives rise to a high 
degree of congruence and should lead to notable belief 
revision. 
Therefore, when presented with a M&D style confusion 
about whether our current experience is a memory or an 
imagining, we would be wise to review evidence for our 
judgments; i.e. seek cross-modal phenomenological support 
for supposed memories, checking our motivations for 
holding beliefs, our prior history of making mistakes etc.. 
We should take inconsistencies in the evidence as reasons to 
downgrade our belief that we are remembering using a 
Bayesian model of rational decision-making, so long as 
each sort of evidence had independent validity. Similarly, 
we should upgrade our convictions should a careful revision 
yield evidential coherence. 
Discussion 
One problem for Lewis account is whether faculties of 
the mind are sufficiently independent to count as separate 
witnesses. Although our intellect may value truth, our 
emotions crave consistency. Our beliefs are validated by 
their relationship with existing beliefs (Quine, 1978). It is 
possible that as we change one set of beliefs, we will 
subconsciously influence other modalities to fit into the new 
narrative. For example, when false memory experiment 
participants find an untested word familiar and then claim to 
be able to vividly see it as a true memory, their imagination 
may simply be constructing a conforming image.  
Another problem is that whilst these theories might be 
true descriptions of how we do evaluate our memories, are 
they capable of giving guidance on how we should evaluate 
them? Though our use of mnemic qualia may have some 
evolutionary or cultural explanation, it may not be 
objectively rational and thus should be systematically 
discouraged. Similarly, merely because we evolved a taste 
for sugar and fat, does not justify our consumption of them 
at current levels. 
A third concern is perhaps the most devastating: What if 
the coherence of belief and qualia provide no information at 
all? Subjects implanted with false memories have a non-
zero prior belief that their experience is a memory and their 
vivid imaginations can provide quite coherence recreations 
to back up these beliefs. In fact, individuals with a particular 
penchant for inventing detail and coherence could be most 
vulnerable to false memories. 
There is no doubt that the source monitoring and 
Bayesian solution requires a normal individual and a 
degree of normality in the circumstances when memories 
are formed and recollected. Is this a useful place to begin? I 
argue that knowing normal conditions of memory success is 
useful just as knowing normal conditions of perception is 
useful. Individual differences in source monitoring capacity 
require individual modifications to the model, just as poor 
eyesight requires extra evaluation of visual judgments for 
those affected. In fact, the exciting aspect of this model is 
that it goes some way in explaining why source monitoring 
is sub-optimal in false memory experiments, functional 
amnesia or schizophrenia. Thus, aberrant cases need not 
threaten my defense of mnemic qualia to influence our 
beliefs. 
Conclusion 
Assertions regarding the origin of our thoughts are 
evaluated by examining the quality of the mental 
experience, such as the level of detail in our mental images, 
the degree of emotional salience or even a sense of being 
there. People offer factual details of events they purport to 
remember. Thus, memories seem distinguished from 
imaginings partially by the way they feel and partially 
because of surrounding beliefs. In this paper, I have argued 
that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience 
provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly 
as it pertains to memory.  
The philosophical defense of mnemic qualia has empirical 
support within the source-monitoring literature from 
psychology. Successful source monitoring is an inferential 
process that requires people to examine and categorize their 
mental state based on qualitative features of the experience 
itself and coherence with other beliefs.  
The coherence view in the source monitoring literature in 
psychology is supported by Bayesian rationality. This 
pragmatic account explains how normal memories are 
evaluated and successfully segregated from other mental 
phenomena. But, perhaps more impressively, it sheds light 
on circumstances when source-monitoring fails. Because we 
must already begin with a degree of belief in a particular 
memory, Bayesianism explains why psychogenic amnesia 
patients have no capacity to revise beliefs. It also shows 
how individuals who are unusually gifted at creating cross-
modal phenomenology are particularly prone to false 
memories. Individuals who are fantasy-prone, or 
hypnotically suggestible are wise to remain skeptical of 
their qualia, because coherent subjective experiences are too 
easily constructed by their imaginations.  
Regardless of the functional underpinnings of our 
cognitive architecture, consciousness impacts our reasoning 
and this is rationally explained by combining the 
empirically informed source-monitoring literature and a 
Bayesian probability calculus. This framework explains 
how we might evaluate memories in a skeptical context. 
With further research we may know more about how to 
judge our own feelings and beliefs during the experience of 
remembering.. 
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